Notes on <The World as Will and Representation - Volume I> - Appnedix: Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy

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Kant’s three greatest merits

Kant’s greatest merit is the distinction of the phenomenon from the thing-in-itself, based on the proof that between things and us there always stands the intellect, and that on this account they can not be known according to what they may be in themselves.

Kant’s philosophy has a three-fold relation to that of his predecessors; firstly, as we have seen, a relation to Locke’s philosophy, confirming and extending it; secondly, a relation to Hume’s, correcting and employing it; thirdly, a decidedly polemical and destructive relation to the philosophy of Leibniz and Wolff.

The objective world as we know it does not belong to the true being of things-in-themselves, but is its mere phenomenon, conditioned by those very forms that lie a priori in the human intellect (i.e., the brain) ; hence the world cannot contain anything but phenomena. It is true that Kant did not arrive at the knowledge that the phenomenon is the world as representation and that the thing-in-itself is the will. He showed, however, that the phenomenal world is conditioned just as much by the subject as by the object, and by isolating the most universal forms of its phenomenon, i.e., of the representation, he demonstrated that we know these forms and survey them according to their whole constitutional nature not only by starting from the object, but just as well by starting from the subject, since they are really the limit between object and subject and are common to both. He concluded that, by pursuing this limit, we do not penetrate into the inner nature of the object or the subject, and consequently that we never know the essential nature of the world, namely the thing-in-itself.

The second main point of the view of Kant is that he demonstrated the undeniable moral significance of human conduct to be quite different from, and not dependent on, the laws of the phenomenon, to be not even capable of explanation according to them, but to be something directly touching the thing-in-itself.

The third point is the complete overthrow of the scholastic philosophy. The chief characteristic of scholastic philosophy is the guardianship of the prevailing national religion over philosophy, for which there was in reality nothing left but to prove and embellish the principal dogmas religion prescribed for it. Kant ventured to demonstrate by his teaching the impossibility of our being able to prove all those dogmas that were alleged to have been proved. Speculative theology and the rational psychology connected with it received from him their death-blow. They have since vanished from German philosophy. This merit of Kant is connected with the fact that the unreflecting pursuit of the laws of the phenomenon, the enhancement of these to eternal truths, and the raising of the fleeting phenomenon to the real inner being of the world, in short, realism, not disturbed in its delusion by any reflection, had been wholly prevalent in all preceding philosophy of ancient, medieval, and modern times.

The defects of Kant’s philosophy

Although there is no doubt that Kant effected the greatest revolution in philosophy, the result of his appearance is purely negative. People certainly saw that all previous philosophy had been a fruitless dreaming, but they do not know what they ought to adhere to now. Kant’s merit was not complete, but was burdened with great defects, and must have been negative and one- sided. These defects we will now investigate.

First of all, we will clearly present to ourselves and examine the fundamental idea in which lie the plan and purpose of the whole CPR. It started with the following assumptions. (1) Metaphysics is the science of that which lies beyond the possibility of all experience. (2) Such a thing can never be found according to fundamental principles that are themselves first drawn from experience but only what we know prior to, and hence independently of, experience can reach farther than possible experience (3) In our reason (Vernunft), some fundamental principles of the kind are actually to be found; they are comprehended under the name of knowledge from pure reason. Metaphysics is impossible, and in its place we have criticism of pure reason.

Let’s examine the fist assumption: “The source of metaphysics cannot be empirical at all; its fundamental principles and concepts can never be taken from experience, either inner or outer”. Nothing at all is advanced to establish this cardinal assertion except the etymological argument from the word metaphysics. This assumption assumes that metaphysics and knowledge a priori were identical; yet for this it would have been necessary first to demonstrate that the material for solving the riddle of the world cannot possibly be contained in the world itself, but is to be sought only outside it, in something we can reach only under the guidance of those forms of which we are a priori conscious. But so long as this is not proved, we have no ground for shutting ourselves off from the richest of all sources of knowledge, inner and outer experience, in the case of the most important and most difficult of all problems, in order to operate with empty forms alone. Therefore, I say that the solution to the riddle of the world must come from an understanding of the world itself; and hence that the task of metaphysics is not to pass over experience in which the world exists, but to understand it thoroughly, since inner and outer experience are certainly the principal source of all knowledge. I say, therefore, that the solution to the riddle of the world is possible only through the proper connexion of outer with inner experience, carried out at the right point, and by the combination, thus effected, of these two very heterogeneous sources of knowledge.

Kant has nowhere clearly distinguished knowledge of perception from abstract knowledge, and in this way, as we shall see later, he becomes implicated in inextricable contra- dictions with himself. After disposing of the whole world of the senses with the meaningless “it is given,” he now, as we have said, makes the logical table of judgements the foundation-stone of his structure. Kant even didn’t define what reason really is in his text. He says that reason is the faculty of the principles, and that it is opposed to the understanding, which is the faculty of rules. And the distinction between principle and rules lies in the fact that what is known a priori through pure intuition or perception, or through the forms of the understanding, is a rule, and only what results a priori from mere concepts is a principle. The understanding is also being constantly explained afresh. These examples are quoted as proofs of my reproach that Kant pursues his symmetrical, logical system without reflecting sufficiently on the subject with which he thus deals.

Although Kant does not use the formula “No object without subject, “ he nevertheless, with just as much emphasis as do Berkeley and I, declares the external world lying before us in space and time to be mere representation of the subject that knows it. For example: “If I take away the thinking subject, the whole material world must cease to exist, as it is nothing but the phenomenon in the sensibility of our subject, and a species of its representations.”

I now return to Kant’s great mistake, already touched on above, namely that he did not properly separate knowledge of perception from abstract knowledge; from this there arose a terrible confusion which we have now to consider more closely. His “object of experience,” of which he is constantly speaking, the proper subject of the categories, is not the representation of perception, nor is it the abstract concept; it is different from both, and yet is both at the same time, and is an utter absurdity and impossibility. He did not explain clearly whether the “object of experience” is the representation of perception in space and time or merely the abstract concept. It is something between the two in his mind.

Confusion of knowledge of perception and abstract knowledge

The fact, which he strictly demonstrates, that we are a priori conscious of a part of our knowledge, admits of no other explanation at all except that this constitutes the forms of our intellect; indeed this is not so much an explanation as merely the distinct expression of the fact itself. Therefore, I knew of nothing to take away from the theories of the Transcendental Aesthetic, but only of something to add to them. Kant did not pursue his thought to the very end, especially in not rejecting the whole of the Euclidean method of demonstration, even after he said that all geometrical knowledge has direct evidence from perception.

After the detailed discussion of the universal forms of all perception, given in the Transcendental Aesthetic, we necessarily expect to receive some explanation of its content, of the way in which empirical perception enters our consciousness, of how knowledge of this whole world, for us so real and so important, originates in us. But this is not addressed in Kant’s teaching, instead, he says: “The empirical part of perception is given from without.” Therefore, here also from the pure forms of intuition, Kant arrives with one jump at thinking, at the Transcendental Logic.

He says “Our knowledge,” he says, “has two sources, receptivity of impressions and spontaneity of concepts: the former is the capacity of receiving representations; the latter is the capacity for knowing an object through these representations. Through the first an object is given to us, through the second it is thought.” This is false, for according to this the impression, for which alone we have mere receptivity, which therefore comes from without and alone is really “given,” would be already a representation, in fact even an object. But it is nothing more than a mere sensation in the sense-organ, and only by the application of the understanding, and of the forms of perception, of space and time, does our intellect convert this mere sensation into a representation. This is discussed in §21 of “On the Principle of Sufficient Reason”.

If concepts are added, if thinking is added, to which spontaneity can certainly be attributed, then knowledge of perception is entirely abandoned, and a completely different class of representations, namely non-perceptible, abstract concepts, enters consciousness. This is the activity of reason. Kant allows perception, taken by itself, to be without understanding, and thus entirely passive, and only through thinking does he allow an object to be apprehended; thus he brings thinking into perception. But then again, the object of thinking is an individual, real object; in this way, thinking loses its essential character of universality and abstraction, and, instead of universal concepts, receives as its object individual things; thus he again brings perception into thinking. From this springs the terrible confusion referred to, and the consequences of this first false step extend over the whole of his theory of knowledge.

Kant makes a triple distinction: (1) the representation; (2) the object of the representation; (3) the thing-in-itself. The first is the concern of sensibility, which for him includes, simultaneously with sensation, also the pure forms of perception, namely space and time. The second is the concern of the understanding, that adds it in thought through its twelve categories. The third lies beyond all possibility of knowledge. The distinction between the representation and the object of the representation is, however, unfounded. The unwarranted introduction of that hybrid, the object of the representation, is the source of Kant’s errors. Kant’s error, here discussed, is connected with the mistake of his which we previously condemned, namely that he gives no theory of the origin of empirical perception, but, without more ado, treats it as given, identifying it with the mere sensation to which he adds only the forms of intuition or perception, namely space and time, comprehending both under the name of sensibility. According to Kant, the understanding could not be applied to perception; it was supposed merely to think, in order to remain within the Transcendental Logic. With this again is connected another of Kant’s mistakes, namely that he left it to me to furnish the only valid proof of the rightly recognized a priori nature of the law of causality, in other words, the proof from the possibility of objective, empirical perception itself.

After Kant had introduced such great mistakes into the first simple outlines of a theory of the representation-faculty, he took into his head a variety of very complicated assumptions. For example, the synthetic unity of apperception: “The I think must be able to accompany all my representations”. “Must be able to” is a problematic enunciation.

In the same way it follows from the demonstration of the contradictions in the Transcendental Logic which had their ground in the confusion of knowledge from perception with abstract knowledge; further, from the demonstration of the want of a distinct and definite conception of the nature of the understanding and of the faculty of reason. Instead of this we found in Kant’s works only incoherent, inconsistent, inadequate, and incorrect expressions about those two faculties of the mind. Kant skips over this whole world of perception which surrounds us, and which is so multifarious and rich in significance, and he sticks to the forms of abstract think- ing. Although he never states the fact, this procedure is founded on the assumption that reflection is the ectype of all perception, and that everything essential to perception must therefore be expressed in reflection, and indeed in very contracted, and therefore easily comprehensible, forms and outlines.

The whole of reflective knowledge, or reason (Vernunft), has only one main form, and that is the abstract concept. It is peculiar to our faculty of reason itself, and has no direct necessary connexion with the world of perception. It can be demonstrated that all types of judgments lie in the province of our faculty of reason and has no direct connection with the understanding and with knowledge of perception.

Grammar

After having had to reject Kant’s doctrine of the categories, just as he himself rejected that of Aristotle, I will indicate here by way of suggestion a third method of reaching what is intended. Grammar is related to logic as are clothes to the body. Those highest of all concepts, this ground-bass of our faculty of reason, are the foundation of all more special thinking, and therefore without the application of this, no thinking whatever can take place. So what are the forms of thinking?

(1) Thinking consists throughout of judging; judgements are the threads of its whole texture, for without the use of a verb our thinking makes no progress, and whenever we use a verb, we judge.

(2) Every judgement consists in recognizing the relation between a subject and a predicate, which are separated or united by it with various restrictions.

(3) These actual, unalterable, original forms of thinking are certainly those of Kant’s logical table of judgements.

The parts of speech and grammatical forms are modes of expression of the three constituent elements of the judgement, that is, the subject, the predicate, and the copula, and also of their possible relations, and thus of the thought-forms just enumerated, and of the closer determinations and modifications thereof. Therefore substantive, adjective, and verb are essential and fundamental constituents of language in general; and so they are bound to be found in all languages.

Transcendental Dialectic

I return to the Kantian philosophy, and come to the Transcendental Dialectic. Kant opens it with the explanation of reason (Vernunft), which faculty is supposed to play the principal role in it; for hitherto only sensibility and understanding were on the scene.

Here it is now taught that all a priori knowledge hitherto considered, which makes pure mathematics and pure natural science possible, gives us mere rules, but not principles, because it proceeds from perceptions and forms of knowledge, not from mere concepts, which are required if we are to speak of principles. Such a principle should be a knowledge from mere concepts and yet synthetical. But this is absolutely impossible. From mere concepts nothing but analytical propositions can ever result. If concepts are to be combined synthetically and yet a priori, this combination must necessarily be brought about through a third thing, namely a pure intuition or perception of the formal possibility of experience, consequently, a synthetic proposition a priori can never proceed from mere concept. In general, however, we are a priori conscious of nothing more than the principle of sufficient reason in its different forms, and therefore no synthetic judgements a priori are possible other than those resulting from that which gives content to that principle.

There then appears very boldly the abstract principle of reason (Vernunft) with its demand for the unconditioned. But in order to recognize the invalidity of this demand, there is no need of a critique of reason by means of antinomies and their solution, but only of a critique of reason understood in my sense. Such a critique would be an examination of the relation of abstract knowledge to immediate intuitive knowledge by descending from the indefinite generality of the former to the fixed definiteness of the latter. It follows from this that the essential nature of reason (Vernunft) by no means consists in the demand for an unconditioned; for, as soon as it proceeds with full deliberation, it must itself find that an unconditioned is really an absurdity. As a faculty of knowledge, our reason can al- ways be concerned only with objects; but every object for the subject is necessarily and irrevocably subordinated and given over to the principle of sufficient reason. The validity of the principle of sufficient reason is so much involved in the form of consciousness that we simply cannot imagine anything objectively of which no “why” could be further demanded; hence we cannot imagine an absolute absolute like a blank wall in front of us. The series of grounds of knowledge, existing only in the sphere of the abstract, and thus of our faculty of reason, certainly always finds an end in the indemonstrable, in other words, in a representation that is not further conditioned according to this form of the principle of sufficient reason, and thus in the a priori or a posteriori immediately perceptible ground of the highest proposition of the chain of reasoning.

On the whole, the refutation of rational psychology has very great merit, and much that is true. If we wish to retain Kant’s expression just condemned, matter is actually the final subject of all the predicates of every empirically given thing, what is left after removing all its properties of every kind. This holds good of man as well as of the animal, plant, or stone, and it is so evident that, in order not to see it, there is needed a determined will not to see. Subject and predicate, however, are related to substance and accident rather as the principle of sufficient reason or ground in logic is to the law of causality in nature, and the confusion or identification of the two former is just as inadmissible as is that of the two latter. But Kant confuses these subject and predicate with the substance of accident. To discover the sophistry, we need only reflect that subject and predicate are purely logical determinations that concern simply and solely abstract concept. On the other hand, substance and accident belong to the world of perception and to its apprehension in the understanding.

If we examine the real meaning of Kant’s critical resolution of the cosmological argument which follows, it is not what he gives it out to be, namely the solution of the dispute by disclosing that both sides, starting from false assumptions, are wrong in the first and second antinomies, but right in the third and fourth. On the contrary, it is in fact the confirmation of the antitheses by the explanation of their assertion. If the series of grounds and consequents in the world are absolutely without end, then the world cannot be a given whole independent of the representation, for such a thing always presupposes definite limits, just as, on the contrary, infinite series presuppose infinite regressus. Therefore, the presupposed infinity of the series must be determined through the form of ground and consequent, and this in turn through the form of knowledge of the subject. Hence the world, as it is known, must exist only in the mental picture or representation of the subject.

The solution of the third antinomy, whose subject was the Idea of freedom, merits special consideration, in so far as for us it is very remarkable that Kant is obliged precisely here, in connexion with the Idea of freedom, to speak in greater detail about the thing-in-itself, hitherto seen only in the background. This is very easy for us to understand after we have recognized the thing-in-itself as the will. In general, this is the point where Kant’s philosophy leads to mine, or mine springs from his as its parent stem. The concept of freedom can in its object present a thing-in-itself to our minds, but not in perception; the concept of nature, can present its object to our minds in perception, but not as thing-in-itself. What Kant says merely of the human phenomenon, I have extended to every phenomenon in general which differs from the human only in degree, namely that their essence-in-itself is something absolutely free, in other words, a will.

Kant seems to assume that the thing-in-itself is object, but object also belongs to the form of the phenomenon, so if a thing-in-itself is to be assumed, it would have to lie in a sphere toto genere different from the representation, and therefore could least of all be inferred according to the laws of the connection of objects among themselves.

It is also from this immediate knowledge of one’s own will that in human consciousness the concept of freedom arises; for certainly the will as world-creating, as thing-in-itself, is free from the principle of sufficient reason, and thus from all necessity, and hence is completely independent, free, and indeed almighty.

The real origin of the concept of freedom is in no way essentially an inference either from the speculative Idea of an unconditioned cause, or from the fact that the categorical imperative presupposes it, but springs directly from consciousness. In consciousness everyone recognizes himself at once as the will, in other words, as that which, as thing- in-itself, has not the principle of sufficient reason for its form, and itself depends on nothing, but rather everything else depends on it.

The world itself is to be explained only from the will (for it is the will itself in so far as this will appears), and not through causality. But in the world, causality is the sole principle of explanation, and everything happens solely in accordance with laws of nature. Therefore right is entirely on the side of the antithesis; for this sticks to the point in question, and uses the principle of explanation which is valid with regard thereto; hence it needs no apology. The thesis, on the other hand, is supposed to be drawn by an apology from the matter, that first passes over to something quite different from the point in question, and then takes over a principle of explanation which cannot be applied there.

The fourth antinomy, as I have said already, is according to its innermost meaning tautological with the third.

Refutation of Speculative Theology

The refutation of speculative theology and hence the whole Dialectic of pure reason is to a certain extent the aim and object of the whole work. Kant has eliminated theism from philosophy; for in philosophy, as a science and not a doctrine of faith, only that can find a place which either is empirically given or is established through tenable and solid proofs.

As regards the performance of the task, no CPR was at all necessary to refute the ontological proof of the existence of God, since, even without presupposing the Aesthetic and Analytic, it is very easy to make clear that this ontological proof is nothing but a cunning and subtle game with concepts, without any power of conviction.

The refutation of the cosmological proof is an application to a given case of the doctrine of the Critique expounded up to that point, and there is nothing to be said against it.

If Kant had life and popular theology in view he would add a fourth proof, which is founded on man’s feeling of need, distress, impotence and dependence in face of natural forces infinitely superior, unfathomable, and for the most part ominous and portentous. To this is added man’s natural inclination to personify everything; finally there is the hope of effecting something by entreaty and flattery, and even by gifts. Now how do these gentlemen help themselves? They just assert that the existence of God is a matter of course.

Until the time of Kant, there was a real and well-established dilemma between materialism and theism, in other words, between the assumption that a blind chance, or an intelligence arranging from without according to purposes and concepts, had brought about the world. after the world and its order had become through Kant the mere phenomenon, whose laws rest mainly on the forms of our intellect, the existence and inner nature of things and of the world no longer needed to be explained on the analogy of changes perceived or effected by us in the world; nor can that which we comprehend as means and end have arisen in consequence of such knowledge. Therefore, by depriving theism of its foundation through his important distinction between phenomenon and thing- in-itself, Kant, on the other hand, opened the way to entirely differ- ent and deeper explanations of existence.

Critique of Practical Reason

with Kant practical reason (Vernunft) appears as the source and origin of the undeniable, ethical significance of human conduct, as well as of all virtue, all noble-mindedness, and every attainable degree of holiness. Accordingly, all this would come from mere reason (Vernunft), and would require nothing but this. To behave rationally and to act in a virtuous, noble, and holy manner would be one and the same thing; and to act selfishly, wickedly, and viciously would be merely to behave irrationally. However, all times and all nations and languages have always clearly distinguished the two, and regarded them as two entirely different thing. To say that the sublime founder of the Christian religion, whose course of life is presented to us as the pattern of all virtue, had been the most rational of all men, would be called a very unworthy, and even blasphemous, way of speaking, and almost as much so if it were said that his precepts contained only the best advice for a completely rational life.

Wickedness is quite compatible with the faculty of reason, in fact is really terrible only in this combination, and conversely, nobility of mind is sometimes found in combination with want of reason.

I have declared reason to be the faculty of concepts. It is this quite special class of general, non-perceptible representations, symbolized and fixed only by words, that distinguishes man from the animal, and gives him the mastery of the earth. What human does is done with complete self-consciousness; he knows exactly how his will decides, what he chooses in each case, and what other choice was possible according to the case in point; and from this self-conscious willing he becomes acquainted with himself, and mirrors himself in his actions. In all these references to man’s conduct the faculty of reason can be called practical; it is theoretical only in so far as the objects with which it is concerned have no reference to the conduct of the thinker, but purely theoretical interest, of which very few people are capable. In nearly all men the faculty of reason has an almost exclusively practical tendency. Thus the man lets his conduct be guided not by his thinking, but by the impression of the present moment, almost after the fashion of the animal; and so he is called irrational, although he does not really lack the faculty of reason, but merely the ability to apply it to his own conduct.

Finally, the faculty of reason shows itself quite specially as practical in those really rational characters who on this account are in ordinary life called practical philosophers. They are distinguished by an unusual calmness in unpleasant as well as in pleasant circumstances, an equable disposition, and a fixed adherence to decisions once made. There is really no question of virtue and vice in such reasonableness of conduct, but this practical use of the faculty of reason constitutes man’s real prerogative over the animal; and only in this regard has it a meaning, and is it permissible, to speak of a dignity of man.

In all the cases described, and in all conceivable cases, the distinction between rational and irrational conduct goes back to the question whether the motives are abstract concepts or representations of perception.

On the whole, we can infer from particular passages that Kant’s meaning of practical reason is as follows: Knowledge of principles a priori is an essential characteristic of the faculty of reason; now, as knowledge of the ethical significance of conduct is not of empirical origin, it too is a principium a priori, and accordingly springs from our reason that is thus to this extent practical. I have already said enough about the incorrectness of that explanation of the faculty of reason. But apart from this, how superficial and shallow it is to use here the single quality of being independent of experience, in order to com- bine the most heterogeneous things, while overlooking their fundamental, essential, and immeasurable difference in other respects! Even we assume the ethical significance springs from an imperative that lies within us, from an unconditioned ought, yet it is fundamentally different from universal forms of knowledge. The unconditioned must that is valid for all the experiences possible to us is very different from the unconditioned ought of morality.

The principle of the absolute ought is: So act that the maxim of your will might always be valid at the same time as the principle of a universal legislation. As we have said, it would be quite useful as a guide to the foundation of the State, which is directed towards preventing the suffering of wrong, and desires to procure for each and all the greatest sum of well-being. In ethics, however, where the object of investigation is action as action and in its immediate significance for the doer of the action but not its consequence, namely suffering, or its reference to others that consideration is altogether inadmissible, since at bottom it amounts to a principle of happiness, and hence to egoism.

Therefore we cannot share Kant’s satisfaction that his principle of ethics is not material, in other words, a principle that sets up an object as motive, but merely formal, whereby it corresponds symmetrically to the formal laws with which the Critique of Pure Reason has made us acquainted. Instead of a law, it is only the formula for discovering such a law. Analysis of this formula shows that it is simply and solely regard for our own happiness which gives it content. Therefore it can serve only rational egoism, to which also every legal constitution owes its origin. Another mistake s the pedantic rule that, to be really good and meritorious, a deed must be performed simply and solely out of regard for the known law and for the concept of duty, and according to a maxim known to reason (Vernunft) in the abstract. It must not be performed from any inclination, any benevolence felt towards others, any tender-hearted sympathy, compassion, or emotion of the heart. This is directly opposed to the genuine spirit of virtue; not the deed, but the willingness to do it, the love from which it results, and without which it is a dead work, this constitutes its meritorious element. Christianity, therefore, rightly teaches that all outward works are worthless if they do not proceed from that genuine disposition which consists in true readiness and pure affection. It also teaches that what makes blessed and redeems is not works done (opera operata), but faith, the genuine disposition, that is granted by the Holy Ghost alone, not produced by the free and deliberate will that has in view only the law. This demand by Kant that every virtuous action shall be done from pure, deliberate regard for and according to the abstract maxims of the law, coldly and without inclination, in fact contrary to all inclination, is precisely the same thing as if he were to assert that every genuine work of art must result from a well-thought-out application of aesthetic rules. The one is just as absurd as the other. The question, dealt with by Plato and Seneca, whether virtue can be taught, is to be answered in the negative. However I have spoken at length at the end of our fourth book on the possibility of an entire change of mind or conversion of man (regeneration, new birth), not by means of abstract (ethics), but of intuitive knowledge (effect of grace).

Kant by no means penetrated into the real significance of the ethical content of actions, and this is shown finally by his doctrine of the highest good as the necessary combination of virtue and happiness, a combination indeed where virtue would merit happiness. Here the logical reproach is already leveled at him, that the concept of merit or desert, which is here the measure or standard, al- ready presupposes an ethical system as its measure, and therefore could not be traced from it. The conclusion of our fourth book was that, after all genuine virtue has attained to its highest degree, it ultimately leads to a complete renunciation in which all willing comes to an end. Happiness, on the other hand, is a satisfied willing, and so the two are fundamentally irreconcilable.

Critique of Judgment

It is wonder how in spite of having little chance of seeing an important work of art, Kant was able to render a great and permanent service to the philosophical consideration of art and the beautiful. His merit lies in the fact that, much as men had reflected on the beautiful and on art, they had really always considered the matter from the empirical point of view alone; and, supported by facts, they investigated what quality distinguished the object of any kind called beautiful from other objects of the same kind, in short, what are the means for exciting aesthetic pleasure. The merit was reserved for Kant of investigating seriously and profoundly the stimulation itself, in consequence of which we call the object giving rise to it beautiful, in order, if possible, to discover its constituent elements and conditions in our nature. His investigation, therefore, took the entirely subjective direction. This path was obviously the right one, since, in order to explain a phenomenon given in its effects, we must first know accurately this effect itself, so as thoroughly to determine the nature of the cause.

In Critique of Judgment Kant retained the method of starting from abstract knowledge, in order to investigate knowledge of perception, so that the former serves him, as a camera obscura in which to gather and survey the latter. Just as in the Critique of Pure Reason the forms of judgements were supposed to give him information about the knowledge of our whole world of perception, so in this Critique of Aesthetic Judgement he does not start from the beautiful itself, from the direct, beautiful object of perception, but from the judgement concerning the beautiful, the so-called, and very badly so-called, judgement of taste. His real solution to the problem, however, is so very inadequate, and remains so far beneath the dignity of the subject, that it can never occur to us to regard it as objective truth. I therefore consider myself exempt from a refutation of it, and here too I refer to the positive part of my work.

By far the most excellent thing in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement is the theory of the sublime. It is incomparably more successful than that of the beautiful, and gives not only, as that does, the general method of investigation, but also a part of the right way to it, so much so that, although it does not provide the real solution to the problem, it nevertheless touches on it very closely.

In the Critique of the Teleological Judgement we can, on account of the simplicity of the subject-matter, recognize perhaps more than anywhere else Kant’s peculiar talent for turning an idea about and about, and expressing it in many different ways, until a book has come out of it. The whole book tries to say only this: that although organized bodies necessarily seem to us as though they were constructed according to a conception of purpose which preceded them, this still does not justify us in assuming it to be objectively the case. For our intellect, to which things are given from without and indirectly, which therefore never knows their inner nature whereby they arise and exist, but merely their exterior, cannot comprehend a certain quality peculiar to the organized productions of nature otherwise than by analogy, since it compares this quality with the works intentionally made by man, whose quality is determined by a purpose and by the conception thereof. This analogy is sufficient to enable us to comprehend the agreement of all their parts with the whole, and thus to serve even as a guide to their investigation. But it cannot be made on this account the actual ground for explaining the origin and existence of such bodies. For the necessity of so conceiving them is of subjective origin.

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