The account of inner sense sketched in the preceding chapter constitutes only half of the Kantian view of self-knowledge. The second is his analysis of apperception. Inner sense and apperception are two distinct, yet complementary forms of self-consciousness Together they are supposed to yield a two fold consciousness of a single I or subject.

Kant’s account of self-knowledge is rooted in his theory of inner sense, according to which we can know ourselves only insofar as we affect ourselves and, therefore, only as we appear to ourselves. The general thesis is self-knowledge is subject to the same transcendental conditions as the knowledge of objects distinct from the self. This will involve (1) an analysis of the claim that time is the form of inner sense (2) a determination of the nature of the object of inner sense and inner experience (3) an examination of Kant’s argument for the phenomenality of this object.

First part deals with the general problem of finding a justification for referring to things as they are in themselves. The second traces the relationship between the concept of the thing in itself and noumenon and transcendental object. Third attempts to provide a solution to the problem of affection, by suggesting a sense in which Kant can consistently maintain that things as they are in themselves affect us.

The argument of the Second Analogy is the culmination of the Transcendental Analytic. In the eyes of Kant himself, the whole project of establishing a “metaphysic of experience” stands or falls with the success of this argument. However, Kant formulates the Principle differently in First and Second Edition. In the First: “Everything that happens, that is, begins to be, presupposes something upon which it follows according to a rule” (A189). Second: “All alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect” (B232). In reality, the difference between the two formulations is merely cosmetic. Since the “law of the connection of cause and effect” is equivalent to what is called the Principle of Production in the First Edition. We can safely say that both editions tries to establish the “whatever begins to exist must have a cause of its existence” principle.

The initial problem for any interpretation of the First Analogy is to determine what the argument is intended to prove. This is not as simple a matter as one might suppose.