The Phenomenology of Spirit
There are few commentaries worth reading after skimming through some reddit threads.
This is my personal blog, where I'll share interesting things about western philosophy, literature, theology, mathematics and computer science.
There are few commentaries worth reading after skimming through some reddit threads.
In history of philosophy, Schelling has been regarded as “an intermediate figure”. The tendency to treat Schelling as a foot stool has been especially mislead- ing with regard to his role in the development of German idealism. Persistently, Schelling has been valued only as the predecessor of Hegel. It was Schelling who fathered the basic principles and who forged the central themes of the absolute idealism that Hegel loyally defended and systematized from 1801 to 1804.
Similar to Spinoza, the term “absolute” usually meant nothing more than the universe as a whole. Hence its cognates were sometimes ‘the universe’, ‘the one and all’ or ‘being’.
There are two interpretations of Fichte’s idealism. According to one interpretation, Fichte’s early idealism is essentially a form of “absolute idealism” because it affirms the existence of an absolute ego that posits itself as all reality, and that creates not only the form but also the content of experience. According to the other interpretation, Fichte’s early idealism is basically a form of “subjective idealism” because it limits all knowledge down to the representations of the finite subject and confers only a regulative status upon the absolute ego. Such subjective idealism is essentially a form of solipsism, because it either denies or doubts the reality of anything beyond our own representations.
Explicitly and emphatically, the German idealists criticized some of the central assumptions of the Cartesian tradition: that self-consciousness is certain and given; that we know ourselves with more certainty than objects in space; that knowledge is the result of contemplation rather than action; that the bearers of meaning are ideas; and, at least after Kant, that we know ourselves apart from and prior to others. This critique of the Cartesian legacy begins with the early Kant; it grows in intensity with the first Critique; and it comes to a climax with Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.