Notes on <An Essay Concerning Human Understanding> by John Locke

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Background

John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding is sometimes considered to be the beginning of philosophical enlightenment. Similar to Descartes’ Meditation on First Philosophy, the major theme of the book is to search for the foundation of knowledge, that is, how is knowledge possible, how do we know what we know is true. However, Locke refutes that there is rationalist innate knowledge, but proposed that all knowledge starts from experience, he describes the mind at birth as a blank slate(tabula rasa) filled later through experience. This is the common belief for empiricism in modern philosophy.

Introduction

The introduction of the book quotes Ecclesiastes, which is pretty interesting:

As thou knowest not what is the way of the Spirit, nor how the bones do grow in the womb of her that is with child : even so thou knowest not the works of God, who maketh all things. – Eccles. 11.5.

In the beginning it says “It is the understanding that sets man above the rest of sensible beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion which he has over them”, which resonates what Descartes discovered in his meditation, that I am a “thinking thing”, the ability to think and understand is the essence of man. The task of the book is “to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent”.

He also talks about the method of the inquiry: First the origin of the ideas and opinions, second, to show the knowledge and understanding we can get from the ideas, third, inquiry into the nature and grounds of faith of opinion. And in addition, the extent of comprehension, that is the capacity of our understanding, when can we attain certainty and when we can only guess.

Even though the human understanding might be little for vast extent of things, it is enough to lead them to the knowledge of their Maker, and the sight of their own duties. “The Candle that is set up in us shines bright enough for all our purposes.”. Knowing the capacity of understanding is also helpful for avoiding skepticism and idleness resulted from incorrect expectations of what we can know.

In the end of the introduction, Locke also talks about the what he means by “idea” in the book: the object of understanding when a man thinks. And the first inquiry is about how the ideas come into the mind.

Book I: Neither Principles nor Ideas Are Innate

This book argues that there is no innate speculative principles like the laws in logic, law of identity(“What is, is”) and law of non contradiction(“It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be”) and no innate practical or moral principles.

No Innate Speculative Principles

The main point to refutes the arguments for the existence of innate speculative principles is that there is no universal consent on the speculative principles since these principles are not known to children or idiots. He also refutes the possible reaction that men know these speculative principles when they come to the use of reason.

Locke also talks about the steps by which the mind attains truth. First, senses let in ideas, and mind grows familiar with them, then abstracts them, and learns the use of general names. The knowledge of some truths are not innate but acquired.

Assent to innate truths depends on having clear and distinct ideas of what their terms mean. People come to realize the maxims as soon as they knows what the terms mean, this is limited by people knowing the meaning of the terms.

People might say that assenting as soon as proposed proves that these are innate ideas, but if that is the case then there will be many propositions like “one and two are equal to three” be considered innate. But assenting as soon as proposed is a mark of self evidence, not innateness.

People might argue that less general propositions are known before these universal terms. But if we think about it, that is not the case, we may know less general propositions before knowing the universal terms.

For children, idiots, savages, and illiterate people, it might very well be expected that these principles should be perfectly known to naturals, but that is not the case, which proves these principles are not innate.

No Innate Practical Principles

If the we can’t find general consent in speculative maxims, it is even harder to do so for moral principles. Moral principles require reasoning and discourse, and some exercise of the mind, to discover the certainty of their truth, so they are less evident than speculative maxims.

Faith and justice are not owned by all men, for example, thieves and villains do not assent to innate principles.

People might say that though men may deny these principles in practice but admit it in their thoughts. Locke’s answer is that the actions of men the best interpreters of their thoughts and it is very strange and unreasonable to suppose innate practical principles, that terminate only in contemplation.

Virtue generally approved, not because innate, but because profitable. Virtue is beneficial to the preservation of society. Self-interest, and the conveniences of this life, make many men own an outward profession and approbation of them.

If we think men’s actions to be the interpreters of their thoughts we can find that the rule of virtue is not their internal principle.

Conscience is not a proof of innate moral rule because it is our own opinion or judgment of the moral rectitude or privity of our own actions.

Men have contrary practical principles. There are moral principles by some societies that are condemned by another society.

Whole nations reject several moral rules. There will be an object that it is no argument that the rule is not known, because it is broken. But it is not to be imagined that a whole society of men should publicly and professedly disown and cast off a rule. Whatever practical principle is innate, cannot but be known to every one to be just and good. So no practical rule which is anywhere universally, and with public approbation or allowance, transgressed, can be supposed innate.

How men commonly come by their principles. They were taught of these principles when they were children and grow up confirmed to them. And they build their religion and manners based on these

To show how the understanding proceeds it is necessary to give an account of the reasons I had to doubt of innate principles. I hope to erect the edifice on a firm basis. All that I shall say for the principles I proceed on is I can only appeal to men’s own unprejudiced experience and observation.

Book II: Of Ideas

Idea is the object of thinking. After rejecting innate ideas in the previous book, Locke tries to establish the theory of ideas by describing the process how people get ideas. He thinks that “All ideas come from sensation or reflection”. Mind is like a white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas, and the foundation of knowledge is Experience. The observations of external material objects or internal operations of minds perceived and reflected by our minds is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. The idea comes from two sources: Sensation, which is observation of external objects and Reflection, which comes from reflection of the internal operations of mind. In the reception of the simple ideas, the understanding is for the most part passive.

Simple Ideas

Locke also classified ideas into simple and complex ideas. Simple ideas can be further divided to the following categories:

  1. Ideas come to mind by one sense only, for example Solidity, from touch.
  2. Ideas come to mind by more than one senses, for example things of space or extension since they can be perceived both by seeing and touching.
  3. Ideas from reflection, for example, perception, contemplation, willing.
  4. Ideas suggested to the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection, for example pleasure, pain, power(which is “free will” according to the description), existence and unity.

Regarding simple ideas of sensation, we can also distinguish from primary qualities and secondary qualities. Primary qualities of bodies are the qualities that is inseparable from it, like extension, figure, motion or rest and number. Secondary qualities are not in the body but the power to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities. Examples of secondary qualities are colors, sounds, tastes.

Complex Ideas

Complex ideas are combinations of simple ideas:

  1. Complex Ideas: Combining several simple ideas into one compound one
  2. Ideas of Relations: Bringing two ideas, whether simple or complex, together, and setting them by one another, so as to take a view of them at once, without uniting them into one ;
  3. General Ideas: Separating them from all other ideas that accompany them in their real existence: this is called abstraction.

Another thing to note here is that complex ideas are made voluntarily rather than passively.

Complex ideas are either modes, substances or relations. Ideas of modes mean the ideas that has dependences on or affections of substances, for example, triangle, gratitude, murder. Ideas of substances are combinations of simple ideas to represent distinct particular things. Ideas of relation consists in the consideration and comparing one idea with another.

Later parts of the book analyzes different complex ideas.

Book III: Of Words

Words are used to signify the presence or absence of positive ideas and have great dependence on common sensible ideas. General and universal are creatures of the understanding, and belong not to the real existence of things. In terms of the problem of universals, Locke is a conceptualist, which means universals can be real but only exist as concepts within the mind.

Locke also talks about the abuse of words. For example, some words are without clear ideas or distinct meanings, and the remedies of that through regulating the meaning and usage of words in a more consistent way.

Book IV: Of Knowledge and Probability

Our knowledge conversant about our ideas only since the only object for mind is idea. Knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, and these agreement and disagreement can be of four sorts:

  1. Identity, or diversity. One distinct idea will agree with itself and disagree with other ideas.
  2. Abstract Relations between ideas.
  3. Co-existence, or necessary connexion, which the perception of the mind is employed about, is co-existence or non-co-existence in the same subject, and this only applies to substances. For example, the co-existence of ideas like fixedness, yellowness, weight makes up the idea of gold.
  4. Real existence, that of actual real existence agreeing to any idea.

Knowledge is either actual or habitual. Actual knowledge is the present view that mind has of the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas, or of the relation they have one to another. When some proposition that a man perceived before comes again to be reflected on, he, without doubt or hesitation assents to it, and is certain of the truth of it. This is habitual knowledge.

There are different degrees of knowledge.

  1. Intuitive. If we will reflect on our own ways of thinking, we will find, that sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other: and this I think we may call intuitive knowledge.
  2. Demonstrative. The mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of any ideas, not immediately, but through clearly perceived proofs.
  3. Sensation. This kind of knowledge admits only probability. Things that contributes to probability are the consistency of what I believe with my experience and the testimony of others.

Locke also examines the extent and reality of knowledge. What is the criterion for real knowledge? Since mind knows things not immediately, but through ideas. Our knowledge, therefore is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things. The conformity between our simple ideas and the existence of things, is sufficient for real knowledge. Complex ideas, except ideas of substances, are their own archetypes, they are not intended to be the copies of anything, nor referred to the existence of anything. So we cannot but be infallibly certain, that all the knowledge we attain concerning these ideas is real. Because in all our thoughts, reasonings, and discourses of this kind, we intend things no further than as they are conformable to our ideas. So that in these we cannot miss of a certain and undoubted reality. Hence the reality of mathematical knowledge and moral knowledge.

Truth is a right joining or separating of signs, or right mental or verbal propositions. Maxims are the propositions that does not increase our knowledge.

We have the knowledge of our own existence by intuition, of the existence of God by demonstration, and of other things by sensation.

Knowledge is not got from maxims. Clear and distinct ideas with settled names, and the finding of those intermediate ideas which show their agreement or disagreement, are the ways to enlarge our knowledge.

Our knowledge is partly necessary and partly voluntary, and the application of our faculties is voluntary.

Locke also talks about the relationship between faith and reason. Regarding reason, Locke shows

  1. That we are of necessity ignorant, and want knowledge of all sorts, where we want ideas.
  2. That we are ignorant, and want rational knowledge, where we want proofs.
  3. That we want certain knowledge and certainty, as far as we want clear and determined specific ideas.
  4. That we want probability to direct our assent in matters where we have neither knowledge of our own nor testimony of other men to bottom our reason upon.

Locke argues that it is necessary to know the boundaries of reason and faith, otherwise we dispute in vain.

Reason, as contradistinguished to faith, I take to be the discovery of the certainty or probability of such propositions or truths which the mind arrives at by deduction made from such ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural faculties ; viz. by sensation or reflection.

Faith, on the other side, is the assent to any proposition, not thus made out by the deductions of reason, but upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of communication. This way of discovering truths to men, we call revelation.

In the end Locke also talks about the cause of error, and it can be summarized into the following:

  1. Want of proofs.
  2. Want of ability to use proofs.
  3. Want of will to use them.
  4. Wrong measures of probability.

Influences

Many of Locke’s views were sharply criticized by rationalists and empiricists alike. Rationalist Leibniz wrote a response to Locke’s work in the form of a chapter-by-chapter rebuttal, the Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain (“New Essays on Human Understanding”). Empiricist George Berkeley also criticizes Locke’s views in his book A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge.

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