Notes on <An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding > by David Hume

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Sect. I. Of the different Species of Philosophy

There are two types of philosophy concerning the science of human nature. One considers man chiefly as born for action, this philosophy treats the subject in an easy and obvious manner and is best fitted to please the imagination and engage the affections. The other type of philosophy is abstruse philosophy, which considers man in the light of a reasonable rather than active being, and endeavors to form his understanding more than cultivate his manners. Hume proposes to have a composition of the two philosophy to overcome the drawback of each species of philosophy. As he said in the book:

Be a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a man.

This is actually pretty similar to the modern divide of continental and analytical philosophy. People might say the problem with continental philosophy is that it might talk about things that is not precise, or does not have a meaning, although it is dealing with important things. On the contrary, analytical philosophy is talking about things in a precise manner but nothing is interesting since there is nothing new that can be derived.

Sect. II. Of the Origin of Ideas

There are two types of perceptions, Idea and Impression. Impressions are the more lively perceptions, when we hear, see, feel etc. Ideas are less lively and appear when we reflect on the sensations or movements in Impressions.

Our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones because 1. all compound ideas can be resolved to some simple ideas which are copies of precedent feeling or sentiment and 2. If from the defect of the organ, a man is not susceptible of some sensation, we also find he does not have corresponding ideas. But there is also examples of 2. not always being true, that is simple ideas are not always, in every instance, derived from the correspondent impressions.

Sect. III. Of the Association of Ideas

There are three ways that ideas can be connected to each other: Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause or Effect.

Sect. IV. Skeptical Doubts concerning the Operations of the Understanding

All the objects of human reason can be divided into two kinds, Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact. Examples of the first one are sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic. Examples of second one are things like the sun will rise tomorrow. The contrary of every Matter of Fact is still possible. All reasonings concerning Matters of Fact seem to be founded on the relation of Cause and Effect. We come to the knowledge of Cause and Effect by experience, when we find any particular objects are constantly co-joined with each other. Every effect is a distinct event from its cause and therefore can not be discovered in the cause, and the first conception of it a priori must be arbitrary.

All reasoning can be divided to two kinds, demonstrative reasoning or that concerning relations of ideas, and moral reasoning, or that concerning matter of fact and existence. All our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition that the future will be conformable to the past. All inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past, and that similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities. And the why do we believe that future will resemble the past? Because we know in the past, the future has been resembling the past. There is a circularity in the reasoning. We actually don’t have a proof why future would resemble the past and thus this proposition is totally not based on anything that is demonstrably true.

Sect. V. Skeptical Solution of these Doubts

Solution to these doubts is to adopt a skeptical stand point. In all reasonings from experience, there is a step taken by the mind which is not supported by any argument or process of the understanding. All we observe is a continual succession of objects, and one event following another, and we can’t, by any reasoning, reach the idea of cause and effect. Instead, the principle we follow to get the idea of cause and effect is Custom or Habit. It is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar chain of events with those which have appeared in the past.

Sect. VI. Of Probability

An evidentialist approach to belief is adopted here, that is, we should adjust our belief according to the experience. Hume asserts that there is no such thing as chance in the universe, but that we ignore the real causes of events. Belief is just what’s confirmed by experiment and it is the result not of logical process or empirical evidence but of psychological process.

Sect. VII. Of the Idea of necessary Connexion

This section talks about the origin of the idea of cause and effect, the term used in the text is power or necessary connexion.

Though our idea of power is not copied from any sentiment or consciousness of power within ourselves, when we give rise to animal motion, or apply our limbs to their proper use and office, that their motion follows the command of the will is a matter of common experience, like other natural events: But the power or energy by which this is effected is unknown and inconceivable. We only feel the event, namely, the existence of an idea, consequent to a command of the will: But the manner, in which this operation is performed, the power by which it is produced, is entirely beyond our comprehension.

Another view point from other philosophers is that the true and direct principle of every effect is not any power or force in nature, but a volition of the Supreme Being. When we voluntarily turn our thoughts to any object, and raise up its image in the fancy, it is not the will which creates that idea: It is the universal Creator, who discovers it to the mind, and renders it present to us. Thus according to them, every thing is full of God.

The event of cause and effect seem conjoined, but never connected. And as we can have no idea of any thing which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment, the necessary conclusion seems to be that we have no idea of connexion or power at all, and that these words are absolutely without any meaning, when employed either in philosophical reasonings or common life.

When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with another, we mean only that they have acquired a connexion in our thought, and give rise to this inference, by which they become proofs of each other’s existence.

Sect. VIII. Of Liberty and Necessity

Part I

Definition of Necessity Our idea of necessity and causation arises entirely from the uniformity observable in the operations of nature, where similar objects are constantly conjoined together, and the mind is determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the other. Beyond the constant conjunction of similar objects, and the consequent inference from one to the other, we have no notion of any necessity or connexion.

Another point emphasized in the text is that human motives, actions and operations of the body are uniform, in the sense that people from different period of time, and from different places share similar actions and motives.

Definition of Liberty By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will. The definition needs to observe two requisite: first, that it be consistent with plain matter of fact; secondly, that it be consistent with itself. It is universally allowed that nothing exists without a cause of its existence, and that chance, when strictly examined, is a mere negative word, and means not any real power which has anywhere a being in nature. We cannot define cause without referring to a necessary connexion with its effect; and liberty, when opposed to necessity, not to constraint, is the same thing with chance; which is universally allowed to have no existence.

Here Hume is proposing a theory of meaning, basically trying to reduce all the definitions we have to the sense impressions, and all the ideas must be reduced to these sense impressions in order to be meaningful. And to Hume, liberty, similar to chance, has no existence in this context.

In terms of free will, Hume is a compatibilist, that is, liberty is compatible with necessity:

It is universally allowed that nothing exists without a cause of its existence . . . Liberty, when opposed to necessity, not to constraint, is the same thing with chance; which is universally allowed to have no existence.

A summary of Hume’s view on free will can be found here.

Part II

Naturally, the next problem Hume need to address is the justification of moral responsibility given the seemingly non existent Liberty or free will.

Men should not be blamed for actions that’s performed not out of their character and disposition. Actions render a person criminal merely as they are proofs of criminal principles in the mind.

There are two objections based on the theory in previous section. First, that, if human actions can be traced up, by a necessary chain, to the Deity, they can never be criminal; on account of the infinite perfection of that Being from whom they are derived, and who can intend nothing but what is altogether good and laudable. Secondly, if they be criminal, we must retract the attribute of perfection, which we ascribe to the Deity, and must acknowledge him to be the ultimate author of guilt and moral turpitude in all his creatures.

Answer to first objection is that the WHOLE, considered as one system is ordered with perfect benevolence, the existence of evil is to prevent greater evil or produce greater good. And we need to distinguish between vice and virtue because the distinctions are found in natural sentiments of the human mind.

Hume does not have an answer for the second objection and admits that these are mysteries and we should focus on the examination of common life, where we find difficulties enough to employ the enquiries.

Sect. IX. Of the Reason of Animals

This section talks about the reason of animals, but typically we call them instincts.

Sect. X. Of Miracles

A wise man proportions his belief to the evidence. A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature. No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavors to establish.

Sect. XI. Of a particular Providence and of a future State

This sections talks about a discussion between Hume and his skeptic friend. In the end Hume raises the doubt whether it be possible for a cause to be known only by its effect or to be of so singular and particular a nature as to have no parallel and no similarity with any other cause or object, that has ever fallen under our observation. (This is referring to the fact that people inferring the existence of a Deity based on the created universe alone.)

Sect. XII. Of the academical or skeptical Philosophy

This sections makes some comments on the skeptical position. For example, how do we know for sure about the existence of the external object?

There are two objections to the notion of external object, one is that it’s either contrary to reason or natural instinct and has no rational evidences with it. The other is that is’t contrary to reason because if all sensible qualities are in the mind, then the existence of external object is not necessary, we can annihilate both primary and secondary qualities and leave only a certain unknown, inexplicable something, as the cause of our perceptions.

Although skeptics questions the foundation of our common beliefs, but Hume thinks that has no bearing on how people live:

all his objections are mere amusement, and can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act and reason and believe; though they are not able, by their most diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these operations, or to remove the objections, which may be raised against them.

In the end of the book, Hume expresses his view on knowledge that it should either it contain abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number or experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence.

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