Notes on <Kant's Transcendental Idealism> - Transcendental Realism and Transcendental Idealisms
The Nature of Transcendental Realism
In the Fourth Paralogism of the first version of Critique, Kant argus that transcendental realism results in empirical idealism since space and time are regarded as properties of things in themselves, we are forced to deny that mind has immediate experience of such objects.
The second passage is from Antinomy of Pure Reason, Kant said transcendental realists treats modifications of our sensibility as self-subsistent things, that is, treats mere representations as things in themselves.
Transcendental realism confuses mere representations with things in themselves. It is shared by all philosophers who do not achieve the critical standpoint.
Some Varieties of Transcendental Realism
Transcendental realism leads to empirical idealism. As Descartes said the only objects we are immediately aware of are ideas in the mind. Kant points out that it would be acceptable if in talking about these transcendentally external objects, one refrain from ascribing them spatial or temporal predicates. The problem for is Descartes regards experientially external objects as belonging to res extensa(extended thing). It is this categorical mistake that generates skepticism with this form of idealism.
A more obvious example is provided by Newtonians. Their view on absolute space and time is the confusion of epistemic condition with ontological conditions, which is equivalent to confusion of appearances with things in themselves.
Both Hume and Berkeley’s impressions are given to the mind as they are in themselves. Since both of them failed to recognize the existence of a priori form of sensibility through which these impressions are received. Both of them confused appearances with things in themselves and are transcendental realist from Kant’s perspective.
Transcendental Realism and the Theocentric Model of Knowledge
Transcendental realism can also be understood from a theocentric model of knowledge. We can have an intellect which functions as a regulative idea, that has a “God’s eye view” of things. The model is a heritage from Platonic tradition, and is present in the rationalists in seventeenth century. This is seen in Leibniz, Locke and Kant himself.
The Transcendental Nature of Kant’s Idealism
Transcendental Idealism as Formal Idealism
Kant’s idealism is “formal” in the sense that it is a theory about the conditions under which objects can be experienced or known by human mind, this is to be contrasted with idealisms of the Cartesian or Berkeleian sort, which are about contents of consciousness.
The understanding of standard pictures comes from Kant’s emphasis on the objects of human experience are only “appearances” and “mere representations”. However, the claim is not that objects have no independent existence, it’s rather that such existence cannot be attributed to them “in the manner in which they are represented”.
There is an implicit principle in the Critique: whatever is necessary for the representation or experience of something as object must reflect the cognitive structure of the mind. To claim otherwise is to assume that mind can access to an object independently of the elements that are conditions of the possibility of doing this in the first place.
Kant’s “Copernican Revolution” and the Anthropocentric Model of Knowledge
Kant’s revolution is described as following:
Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them
a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowlege.
It’s clear that Kant is contrasting transcendental realism with transcendental idealism. Kant’s position is that transcendental realism, with its theocentric model, is incapable of explaining knowledge of any sort, that is why philosophical revolution is necessary.
The contrary position expresses the central tenet of transcendental idealism and also appeals to an anthropocentric model. With this model, we can account for knowledge for these objects since they must conform to a priori epistemic conditions that makes experience possible.
The new conception of the object, which is the correlate of the conception of an epistemic condition, is the major outcome of Kant’s “Copernican Revolution”.
Transcendental Idealism and Phenomenalism
According to Jonathan Bennett, phenomenalism is a theory of object language statement, all such statements are translatable into complex statements about sense data. “Objects are logical constructs out of sense data”. Idealism like Berkeley’s is saying that “Objects are collections of sense data”. Both views treats sense data out of which objects are constructed as things in themselves.
To explain the existence of unperceived objects, one interpretation from Berkeley that’s similar to phenomenalistic interpretation is that “if one were in position or had proper instruments, one would perceive x”, it established the correlation between existence and perception. Kant’s account bears a superficial resemblance to this interpretation. The distinctive feature is that on a transcendental idealistic analysis, the claim that a certain entity or event is to be met with in the advance of experience turns out to be an elliptical way of affirming some lawful connection between the entity or event in question and present experience. It does not involve the postulation of a hypothetical mental episode in the history of some consciousness.
The role of intellectual conditions is clear in analysis of actuality. Kant hold that whatever is actual must be an object of possible perception, but this is merely a consequence, not a criterion of actuality. The criterion of actuality are provided by the Analogies of Experience, a set of a priori principles or intellectual conditions. The claim itself is not about any “subjective experiences”.
To summarize, Berkeleian material idealism and phenomenalism’s appearance are linked to the notion of possible experience, Kant’s appearance is defined in terms of conformity to a set of a priori conditions.